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II

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arrives on appeal from the district court's entry of judgment in a nonjury civil action involving claims of easements on two adjoining parcels of real property
on Hayden Lake. One parcel is owned by the plaintiff/responde nt, hereinafter
"Lorenzen" and the adjoining parcel is owned by the defendant/appell ant, hereinafter
"Pearson". The judgment established the current existence and location of express
appurtenant easements in favor of each party on the real property owned by the
opposing party. Claims for implied easements, public dedication and damages by
Lorenzen and injunctive relief and quiet title by Pearson were denied by the trial court.
This dispute between the parties arose from the specific language used to create
two easements in Trial Exhibit 2. Trial Exhibit 2 was executed on October 28, 1976,
forty years prior to the commencement of this proceeding. The parties to Trial Exhibit
2 are deceased. They had occupied their respective properties for more than ten years
prior to October 28, 1976. A copy of Trial Exhibit 2 is attached as Exhibit A to this
brief. In pertinent part the deed contains the following language:

RESERVING unto Grantors, their heirs, successors and assigns, the right to use
the oval roadway as the same now exists on the above described property, and

Also granting to Grantees the right to use for ingress and egress the existing
roadway running from the South-westerly corner of the above described
property Southerly to the existing highway.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Pearson asserts that by including the expression "heirs, successors and assigns" in the
reservation to Willams and excluding the same expression or any similar language in
the grant to Lorenzen that the intent of the grantor was unambiguous and clear in not
extending the easement granted to Lorenzen to their heirs, successors and assigns.
Lorenzen asserts that the cited language is ambiguous and can be interpreted to mean
that the easement granted to Lorenzen was intended to extend to their heirs, successors
and assigns. Despite a complete absence of contemporaneous evidence, excepting
historical use, the trial court held that the cited language is ambiguous and that
Williams intended that the easement granted to Lorenzen extend to their heirs,
successors and assigns.
The trial court further found that the language in the deed describing the
easement as running from the South-westerly corner of the above described parcel
Southerly to the existing highway is ambiguous as a matter of law and extended the
easement approximately thirty feet in a direction north and fifteen feet west of the
South-westerly corner of the above described parcel. This expansion of the easement
significantly impairs the Pearson property by shrinking a small parking and
maneuvering space. Pearson asserts that the pertinent language is clear and not
ambiguous and the easement should not be extended north or west of the Southwesterly corner of the referenced parcel. Lorenzen presented no evidence or argument
that the referenced language is ambiguous.
The trial court further found that the express easement included the
"unrestricted right to access TN 11365 and 11366 from Defendant's driveway for
parking." Evidence in the case shows that neither Pearson's predecessor in interest
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nor Lorenzen's predecessor in interest owned TN 11366 at the time Trial Exhibit 2 was
executed. Pearson asserts that no language in Trial Exhibit 2 authorizes the Court to
expand the easement to serve TN 11366. Nevertheless, the trial court expanded the
easement to provide access to TN 11366 from the Pearson driveway.

II. COURSE OF PROCEED INGS
Lorenzen filed its complaint against Pearson on October 14, 2016. The
complaint sought a combination of injunctive, declaratory and damages relief alleging
the existence of an appurtenant easement either expressly or by implication,
interference with contract and violation of restrictive covenants by Pearson. On
November 1, 2016, the parties stipulated to a preliminary injunction regulating use of
the easement and conduct of the parties pending further order from the trial court.
Pearson filed their answer and counterclaim s on June 27, 2017, generally denying the
claims of Lorenzen and seeking a quiet title judgment declaring the Lorenzen had no
easement over Pearson property. On July 21, 2017 the trial court denied Pearson's
request for a preliminary injunction barring Lorenzen use of the disputed easement
during the pendency of this action. Immediately following the hearing the parties asked
the trial court for an expedited trial date. Trial was set and then conducted on October
17 and 18, 2017. The trial court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on
February 28, 2018. Though no evidence was introduced or admitted at trial to establish
a metes and bounds description of the easement found by the trial court, the trial court
issued its final judgment on January 25, 2019. Notice of appeal was filed on February
8, 2019.
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III.

STATEME NT OF FACTS

This case presents as its central issue the interpretatio n of a quitclaim deed that
was executed on October 28, 1976 wherein Roy and Quintilla Williams conveyed their
interest in a parcel that is now identified as Kootenai County Tax Assessor's Parcel
Number, hereinafter "TN", 10420, to Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen. (Trial Exhibit 2),
hereinafter the "Deed". All of the parties to the Deed are now deceased. This action is
between the successors in interest of the Lorenzens and Williams.
Trial Exhibit 29 provides a useful orientation to the parcels that are involved in
this matter. A minimized copy is attached as Exhibit B. The parcels are located on the
south shore of Hayden Lake in Kootenai County, Idaho. The Lorenzen parcels are
adjacent to and east of the Williams parcels. The Lorenzens and Williams were resident
in Spokane, Washington. The properties involved in this action were used by their
respective owners as part-time seasonal residences. For more than ten years prior to
October 28, 1976, Lorenzens owned TN 3507, 3894, 3364 and a lakefront parcel
identified as Honeysuckle Hills lot 37. The dwelling was located and remains on TN
3507. During the same ten year period the Williams owned TN 3513, 3887, 3573 and
lakefront parcels identified as Honeysuckle Hills lots 39 and 40A. Their properties
were accessible via Jacob's Ladder Trail on the north of 3507 and 3513 and from the
south over a driveway on TN 10420 and 9800. The driveway had existed for many
years prior to 1976 and had been used by both parties as access routes to their
respective properties. Williams acquired an ownership interest in TN 10420 and TN
9800 approximatel y three months prior to October 28, 1976.
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A copy of the Deed is attached to this brief as Exhibit A. In addition to
quitclaimi ng to Lorenzens their interest in TN 10420, Williams reserved to themselves,
and explicitly, their heirs, successors and assigns, the right to use a portion of the
driveway that is located on TN 10420. Williams also granted to Lorenzens a right to
use the driveway on TN9800, but did not explicitly extend that right to the heirs,
successors and assigns of Lorenzens. The specific language of the reservation to
Williams and grant to Lorenzens is as follows:

RESERVI NG unto Grantors, their heirs, successors and assigns, the right to use
the oval roadway as the same now exists on the above described property, and

Also granting to Grantees the right to use for ingress and egress the existing
roadway running from the South-westerly corner of the above described
property Southerly to the existing highway.

The Deed was recorded in the Kootenai County Recorder's Office on March 15, 1977,
at the request of Hamblen, Gilbert, et al.
On March 30, 1977, Williams conveyed their interest in TN 3513, 3887, 3573,
9799, 9800 and Honeysuckle Hills lots 39 and 40A to Cyrus Vaughan, et al. Trial
Exhibit 3. Pearson objected to the admission of this evidence as proof of the intent of
Williams when they executed the Deed for the reason that the two documents are not
contempor aneous to one another. The trial court nevertheless admitted the exhibit.
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On October 26, 1978 Williams and their immediate successors in interest
conveyed to Lorenzens a small parcel lying between TN 10420 and TN 3513. Trial
Exhibit 4. This parcel is identified on Trial Exhibits 13 and 29 as TN 11365. The
conveyance is significant in that was necessary to the creation of an access for
Lorenzens to TN 10420 over his property rather than over the driveway on TN 9800,
the WilliamsNaugha n parcel. The conveyance was not necessary to their access over
the driveway if Lorenzens were to have an appurtenant easement under the terms of
the Deed. The trial court did not acknowledge the implication of this conveyance in its
analysis of the intent of Williams when he executed the Deed.
Lorenzens acquired TN 3178 and TN 11366 subsequent to 1976. Lorenzens then
sold TN 3178 to their daughter, Shelley Lorenzen, but retained TN 11366 for
themselves. As shown on Trial Exhibit 13, by purchasing TN 3178 and TN 11366
Lorenzens provided TN 3507 with a southerly access to the highway over property that
he owned. This route remains an alternate to the driveway on Pearson's property.
Shelley Lorenzen, Trustee, was substituted as a party to this proceeding after the
death of her mother, Phyllis L. Lorenzen, during the pendency of this action. Lewey
Lorenzen died several years prior to the death of Phyllis L. Lorenzen.
Since prior to 1976 and to the present date TN 3507 has been accessible on its
north side via Jacob's Ladder Trail as shown on Trial Exhibit 29.

IV.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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1. Did the District Court err in holding that the real property of Lorenzen is

decreed to have an express, appurtenant easement for ingress and egress
(a driveway) over real property owned by Pearson?
2. Did the District Court err in its decision holding that the easement
described in said judgment over the real property of Pearson is located
upon and burdens portions of defendants' real property lying north and
west of the southwest corner Kootenai County Tax Parcel Number 10420
said decision being contrary to the express language of the Deed?
3. Did the District Court err in its extension of access to Tax Parcel Number
11366 from the driveway easement?
4. Did the District Court err in its determination that the Deed is ambiguous
as to the whether the easement granted to Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen by
the Deed is appurtenant to TN 10420 and to the heirs, successors and
assigns of the Grantees named therein?
5. Did the District Court err in establishing a metes and bounds description
of the easement without metes and bounds evidence offered or admitted
at trial to support its holding?
6. Did the District Court err in making its regarding the intent of Williams
and the location of the easement for Lorenzen in the Deed without
substantial and competent evidence to support its decision?

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Two standards of review are applicable to this case because it presents
mixed questions of law and fact. The initial question is whether the Deed is
ambiguous. On review the Court exercises free review of questions of law. The
Court has previously addressed the determination of ambiguity holding that
whether an instrument is ambiguous is a question of law.
When this Court interprets a deed, our primary goal is to give effect
to the parties' real intent. Hoch v. Vance, 155 Idaho 636, 639, 315 P.3
824, 827 (2013). If a deed's language is ambiguous, the parties'
intention becomes a question of fact settled by a trier of fact. Id. The
trier of fact must consider all of the surrounding facts and
circumstances and view the deed as a whole and in its entirety. Sells v.
Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 773, 118 P.3d 99, 105(2005). However,
"[w]hen an instrument conveying land is unambiguous, the intention
of the parties can be settled as a matter of law using the plain language
of the document" and without using extrinsic evidence. Porter v.
Bassett, 146 Idaho 399,404, 195 P.3d 1212, 1217 (2008).
A deed is ambiguous when its language is reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretations. Id. A deed is not ambiguous merely
because the parties present differing interpretations to the Court.
Hoch 155 Idaho at 639,315 P3d at 827. Instead, "conflicting
interpretations may arise when a phrase lends itself, without
contortion, to a number of inconsistent meanings." Porter, 146 Idaho
at 404, 105 P.3d at 1217. To determine whether a deed is ambiguous,
the deed must be reviewed as a whole. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503,
508, 65 P .3d 525, 530 (2003).

Camp Easton Forever, Inc., 156 Idaho at 989-990, 332 P.3d at 811-812.
In the event that an instrument is determined as a matter of law to be
ambiguous, then the trial court must determine the intent of the parties to the
instrument. The trial court found the Deed to be ambiguous and determined

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

8

the intent of the parties. When reviewing questions of fact the Court has
held:
Review of a trial court's decision is limited to ascertaini ng whether the
evidence supports the findings of fact and whether the findings of fact
support the conclusion s of law. Since it is the province of the trial
court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the
credibility of the witnesses, this Court will liberally construe the trial
court's findings of fact in favor of the judgment entered. A trial
court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless the
findings are clearly erroneous . If the findings of fact are based upon
substantia l evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting , they will not be
overturne d on appeal. This Court will not substitute its view of the
facts for that of the trial court.

Akers v. D. L. White Construction, Inc., 156 Idaho at 43, 320 P.3d at 434,
(2014).
In its review of this case the Court must first determine as a matter of law under
a free review standard whether the Deed is ambiguous on the issue of whether the
"heirs, successors and assigns" language applies to the grant of easement to Lorenzen.
If the language is not ambiguous then the Court must settle the intention of the parties
on that issue as a matter of law by ascertainin g the plain meaning of the language in the
Deed. If the language is ambiguous , then the Court must review the factual

determinat ions of the trial court on that issue under the clearly erroneous standard.
The same two-step process must then be applied to the decisions of the trial court with
respect to the location of the easement.

VI.

ARGUM ENT

At the conclusion of the presentatio n of evidence in the trial of this matter the
trial court made the following comments:

APPELLA NT'S BRIEF
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I don't know whether you folks went to mediation. I don't know to what extent
you discussed compromise. It occurs to me -and I have no idea how much I'm
going to sort this case out at this point. I've got a lot of work to do before I get
there. But it appears to me there's a compromise. And the compromise that
would resolve the whole thing and create a good fence with good neighbors
would be to have the Lorenzens give up any right they have to use the driveway
for the red barn, and have the Pearsons give up any right to use the circular
driveway. That would give the Lorenzens an alternative access, basically you
would go from the pin on Hayden Lake Road on the southwest corner of TN
11366 up to the--pin that's in the--on the edge of the circular driveway, and
then up to the pin that's at the southwet corner of TN 3573. You can then fence
the boundary. That obviously has implications for both sides. I know of no
authority in any way to compel either party to do that, but there's already been
at least two lawsuits over the approach and boundary.
You're both probably going to be unhappy when I get done. And you're still
going to be using the driveway and the circular driveway, and there will be
future conflicts involving litigation and expense.
One of the bundle of sticks-and we look at property rights as bundles of sticks.
When you convey the entire right, title and interest, it's the entire bundle of
sticks. When you start taking off easements and other restrictions, you're
getting less than the entire bundle. That applies to both parties here. But one of
the most important rights of property in property ownership is the right-to
quiet and peaceful enjoyment. And if the two of you were to draw this line and
separate, it would remove the conflict area. It would require the Lorenzens to
modify there, they could take the circular driveway and make that a yard,
they'd have to move their garage doors, but they have access from Jacob's
Ladder. Mr. Pearson would have his third parking spot without any
interference, without anybody using his driveway. So, I just throw that out.
Tr. Pages 313-314.
The point of the trial court's remarks in this context is that the problem with the
arrangement is apparent to the trial court. The evidence in this case supports the
inference that the problem identified by the trial court above was also apparent as a
potential problem to the parties to the Deed, accessing TN 3507 via a driveway on what
would become Pearson's property raises the potential for trouble. The Deed itself
addressed the issue in part by using the language "heirs, successors and assigns" in
describing the duration of one easement and then omitting the same language in
APPELLAN T'S BRIEF
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creating an easement over the driveway on Pearson's property. By acquiring TN
11366 Lorenzen procured for himself an access route from TN 3507 and TN 10320 to
Hayden Lake Road. The intent of Lorenzen to have an access to his property by a route
other than over his neighbor's property was confirmed by his choice to retain TN 11366
when he sold TN 3178 to his daughter, Shelley, the plaintiff in this case. By executing
the conveyance of TN 11365 through the use of the deed that is Trial Exhibit 4
Lorenzen, Williams and Vaughan together insured the alternate route for Lorenzen by
vesting Lorenzen with ownership with a small but necessary parcel to provide a route
fully owned by Lorenzen.
When Shelley Lorenzen was asked at trial if she knew why her father retained
TN 11366 when he sold her TN 3178, she testified "No. There was never any discussion
about me acquiring that parcel." Tr., p. 61, In. 6. Shelley Lorenzen is an attorney
practicing corporate law. Tr., p. 14, II. 7-9. It seems hard to believe that an attorney
who is purchasing TN 3178 would not inquire or know about plans for TN 11366 when
it is adjacent to her property, has an eastern boundary that is nearer to the dwelling
than the fence line as depicted on Trial Exhibit 13 and obviously provides a physical
connection to Hayden Lake Road. Nevertheless her testimony was that she did not
know of her father's plans for TN 11366. Shelley Lorenzen testified that she was not
aware that her father and Mr. Williams were in litigation with Mr. Kelliher in the fall
of 1976 regarding TN 10420 but that she became aware when advised of the litigation
by Mr. Marfice, her attorney. Tr., p.63, II. 1-14. Shelley Lorenzen never testified that
she was aware of the transaction or negotiations or considerations involved in
generating the Deed contemporaneous ly with October 28, 1976. This testimony and
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absence of testimony shows that Shelley Lorenzen was not aware of circumstances
surrounding the transaction that resulted in the Deed at the time of the conveyance.
Since Shelley Lorenzen was not aware of the circumstances surrounding her parents
acquisition of TN 10420 and all parties to the Deed are deceased, we and the trial court
were left with no witnesses at trial to provide substantial and competent evidence of the
facts and circumstances of the transaction and the Deed. The facts of this case
presenting an absence of witnesses with knowledge of the facts and circumstances,
provide the perfect example of why "Our cases are clear that the legal effect of an
unambiguous written document must be decided by the trial court as a question of
law". Latham v. Garner, 105 Idaho 854, p. 857,673 P.2d 1048, p. 1051 (1983).
The threshold question before the Court in analyzing this case is whether the
Deed is ambiguous as to the extension of the easement therein granted beyond the
deaths of Lewey and Phyllis Lorenzen, the "Grantees". The analytical principles are
expressed as follows:
When this Court interprets a deed, our primary goal is to give
effect to the parties' real intent. Hoch v. Vance, 155 Idaho 636, 639, 315
P.3 824, 827 (2013). If a deed's language is ambiguous, the parties'
intention becomes a question of fact settled by a trier of fact. Id. The trier
of fact must consider all of the surrounding facts and circumstances and
view the deed as a whole and in its entirety. Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho
767, 773, 118 P.3d 99, 105(2005). However, "[w]hen an instrument
conveying land is unambiguous, the intention of the parties can be settled
as a matter of law using the plain language of the document" and without
using extrinsic evidence. Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399,404, 195 P.3d
1212, 1217 (2008).
A deed is ambiguous when its language is reasonably subject to
conflicting interpretations. Id. A deed is not ambiguous merely because
the parties present differing interpretations to the Court. Hoch 155
Idaho at 639, 315 P3d at 827. Instead, "conflicting interpretations may
arise when a phrase lends itself, without contortion, to a number of
inconsistent meanings." Porter, 146 Idaho at 404, 105 P.3d at 1217. To
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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determine whether a deed is ambiguous, the deed must be reviewed as a
whole. Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508, 65 P.3d 525, 530 (2003).

Camp Easton Forever, Inc., 156 Idaho at 989-990, 332 P.3d at 811-812.
The first principle is that the deed must be reviewed as a whole. Id. at 812. In the Deed
the easement reserved to the Grantors is explicitly extended to the heirs, successors and
assigns of the Granto rs. In the following paragraph, the easement granted to the
Grantees is without any language extending the easement to the heirs, successors and
assigns of the Grantees or any other person or entity for that matter. This language is
plain and unambiguous and means that the easement granted to the Grantees does not
extend to their heirs, successors and assigns. Neither Lorenzen nor the trial court
presented any alternate meaning for the language as written. Lorenzen offered no
evidence that the language is patently ambiguous, arguing in briefing only that it is
latently ambiguous. The trial court made no finding of latent ambiguity or any
ambiguity as the language appears in Trial Exhibit 2. A second principle is that the
language must, "without contortion" lend itself to a number of inconsistent meanings.

Id. at p. 812. The trial court in the case now before the Court held that if the two
easement grants are combined into one paragraph and the word "Also" is deleted that
the grant may be interpreted as having a meaning that extends the easement to the
heirs, successors and assigns of the Grantee. There is no evidence in the record that
establishing that the trial court's contortions and interpretatio ns of the language are
reasonable. On its face the relevant language in the Deed constitutes two fully
expressed, independent thoughts in phrases or clauses, as in a compound sentence,
joined by a coordinator, "and" with proper punctuation. Even with the trial court's
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contortion, the "heirs, successors and assigns" language in the first clause is not
properly or reasonably extended to the grant to Lorenzen. With or without the
contortion, the Deed is not ambiguous on this issue.
The issue of the effect and meaning of two easement grants in one conveyance,
one with heirs and assigns language, and one without, was previously decided in Idaho
and reviewed and upheld by the Supreme Court. King v. Lang, 136 Idaho 905, 907-909,
42 P.3d 698, 700-702 (2002). As in the instant case, in King the conveyance contained
two easements, one with the heirs and assigns language and the other without the heirs
and assigns language. As in King, the grant in Trial Exhibit 2 does not identify any
dominant estate to which the grant to Lorenzen was to attach. Also, as in King, the trial
court in the instant case held that persons who have no interest in Lorenzen land are
entitled to use the easement. The holding in King was that the conveyance was
unambiguous and the easement right was not transferred to the successor to the
grantee. On appeal, the decision was sustained by the Supreme Court. Pearson has
found no contrary authority interpreting as ambiguous a conveyance such as found in
the instant case and King.
The analysis and holding urged by Pearson that the Deed is not
ambiguous in this respect is further supported by a decision of the Arkansas Supreme
Court. Riffle vs. Worthmen, 939 S.W.2d 294 (1997). This case involved a conveyance of
land along the Arkansas River. The parcel had no access other than by the river and a
road over land owned by the conveying party. The Arkansas Supreme Court sustained
the holding of the trial court that the language of the quitclaim deed was clear and
unambiguous and the use of the words "heirs and assigns" in the conveyance of the land
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in the quitclaim deed, coupled with the absence of similar words of reservation and
conveyance of the right of ingress and egress, indicated that grantors' intent was to
convey a personal right of access for an easement in gross rather than an appurtenant
easement. Pearson has located no contrary holding by a Court in which heirs and
assigns is present in one conveyance in a document and not present in another
conveyance in the same document.
The trial court further erred in holding that the easement grant to be ambiguous
as a matter of law "because it described the use as only reaching from the southwest
corner of TN 10420". R., p. 105. The pertinent language from the Deed is as follows:
"the existing roadway from the South-wester ly corner of the above described parcel
Southerly to the existing highway". By referring to Trial Exhibit 13 one can see the
South-wester ly corner of TN 10420 and the existing highway directly to the south. The
trial court's analysis on this issue fails the plain meaning and multiple inconsistent
meaning tests from Camp Easton Forever. Id. at p. 812. There is no evidence in the
record of an alternate meaning of the pertinent language that would extend the
easement north and west of the southwest corner of TN 10420. The trial court failed to
identify an alternate meaning of the language but nevertheless held that the easement
would include portions of the oval driveway that are north and west of the Southwesterly corner of TN 10420. The trial court erred in its analysis of this issue and in
extending to easement to areas outside the specific description contained in the Deed.
The trial court erred further when it ordered that Lorenzen's easement rights
under the Deed include the "unrestricted right to access TN 11365 and TN 11366 from
Defendant's driveway for parking". R., p. 112. The Deed makes no provision for
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access to TN 11365 and TN 11366. The trial court has conjured this right only from
testimony by Shelley Lorenzen that Lorenzens had parked on TN 11366 over the years
when they had more guests than could otherwise be accommodat ed. Tr., p. 60, p. 78, II.
22-25.. Neither TN 11365 nor TN 11366 was owned by Lorenzen on October 28, 1976.
There is no provision in the Deed explicitly or ambiguously authorizing use to access
TN 11365 and TN 11366 from the driveway.
The trial court erred in admitting Trial Exhibit 3 over the objection of Pearson
as evidence of the intent of the Granto rs in the Deed. Tr., p. 32, I. 12. The trial court
reasoned that though Trial Exhibit 3 postdates the Deed by five months, it is
"substantiall y contemporan eous" to the Deed and was therefore admitted to show the
intent of Williams five months earlier. R., p. 110. Trial Exhibit 3 is the deed by which
Williams conveyed the property burdened by the driveway easement to Vaughan on
March 30, 1977. The portion of the exhibit that drew the attention of the trial court
was language in Exhibit A to the exhibit, a portion of the deed that described
encumbrance s upon the parcel being conveyed. In item 1 of the exhibit to the deed, the
easement in the Deed granted to Lorenzen over the driveway was described as
including the heirs, successors and assigns of Lorenzen. The trial court held that this
language created doubt about Williams' intention in executing the Deed five months
previously. Pearson submits that the language in Exhibit A to the deed is plainly a
mistake and inconsistent with the express language of the Deed. No party to the
instrument offered testimony as to why the erroneous description of the language from
the Deed was in the document. Only evidence that is contemporan eous with the
conveyance is properly admitted to determine the intent of the parties. Trial Exhibit 3
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is not contemporaneous . It should not have been admitted for the purpose of
establishing the intent of Williams in executing the Deed.

In the background of the ambiguity issue raised in the instant case are policy
considerations associated with emphasizing the priority of the words written in
documents over other evidence that underlie the Statute of Frauds, the parole evidence
rule, merger doctrine, recording statutes as they provide notice of conveyances to third
party bona fide purchasers. Many years ago the Idaho Supreme Court said, "Where
parties have entered into a contract or agreement which has been reduced to writing, in
the absence of fraud or mistake, if the writing is complete on its face and unambiguous,
parol evidence is not admissible to contradict, vary, alter, add to or detract from the
terms of the instrument. This is a universal rule of law, but this rule does not apply
where it appears from the evidence that the agreement was a mere informal
memorandum, manifestly incomplete on its face, and not intended by the parties to
exhibit the whole agreement, but merely to define some of its terms; the writing is
conclusive as far as it goes, but such parts of the actual agreement as are not embraced
within its scope may be established by parol, and where it appears from the writing
itself that it is not complete, parol evidence may supply the omission. Jarrett v. Prosser,
23 Idaho 382, 130 P. 376 (1913).
Especially in real property conveyances as in the instant case in which a
conveyance more than forty years in the past is in issue, the parties thereto are
deceased, and Pearson, as bona fide purchasers have relied on the public record to
make themselves aware of agreements affecting their property, it is important that the
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law support their right to rely on a reasonab le interpret ation of a complete, recorded
and unambig uous deed.
In the instant case we have only one witness, Shelley Lorenzen , who potentially
had any knowledge of the facts and circumst ances surround ing the conveyance. Ms.
Lorenzen testified that during 1977-1980 she was living in Washing ton, D.C. while
attending law school. She returned to her parents' principa l residence in Spokane for
the summer months and during vacations. Tr., pp. 27-28. She testified only to general
observat ions of use of the driveway during the years precedin g the October 28, 1976
conveyance. Tr., p. 24.

She testified to no other knowledge of the Deed conveyance.

No other contemp oraneous person was brought forward as a witness nor other
documen tary evidence to shed light on whether the parties intended anything other
than what was plainly expresse d in the Deed. The passage of forty years may have
taken away other possible witnesses; the engineer or surveyor who prepared the legal
descripti on, the lawyers represen ting Williams and Lorenzen in their litigation with
Kelliher over the property , or attorneys or staffers from Hamblen Gilbert, et al, who
caused the Deed to be recorded . Other than the Deed, the quality of evidence that was
offered to establish the intent of the parties, especially to vary the terms of the Deeed
was so weak as to not be substant ial or competen t. Hence the decisions of the trial court
regardin g the intent of the parties in varying the explicit terms of the Deed were clearly
erroneou s. In deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneou s, the appellate
court determin es whether the findings are supporte d by substanti al, compete nt
evidence. Evidence is regarded as substant ial if a reasonab le trier of fact would accept
it and rely upon it in determin ing whether a disputed point of fact has been proven.
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Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, 143 Idaho 641,643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006). This failure
applies to the trial court's finding that the Grantors intended that the easement granted
to Lorenzens would extend to Lorenzens heirs, successors and assigns and also to the
decision locating the easement north and west of the South-westerly corner of TN 10420
and for access to TN 11366. The evidence relied upon by the trial court for these
decisions was not substantial nor competent.
No evidence of a metes and bounds description for the location of the easement
was offered or admitted into evidence during the trial of case. Subsequent to the
issuance of the decision of the trial court the plaintiff caused a metes and bounds
description to be produced by the engineer that produced Trial Exhibit 13 which
showed the driveway as it now exists. The trial court then integrated the metes and
bounds description into its judgment without a hearing or other opportunity to crossexamine the engineer or rebut his description. The parties later stipulated to a second
engineer to produce a map and description. After initial work was completed by the
second engineer his work was submitted to the opposing party, the trial court decided
to abandon the stipulation and second engineer's work in favor of continuing with the
description initially provided by Lorenzen's engineer. In the event that it is necessary
to define the location of a driveway easement on Pearson's property, Pearson requests
that the Court order a hearing to be held to provide an opportunity for the presentation
of appropriate evidence on that subject and cross-examine any witness that may
appear.
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VIL CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Pearsons ask that the Court reverse the herein
identified decisions of the trial court holding the Deed to be ambiguous on the issue of
the extension of the easement granted to Lorenzens to their heirs, successors and
assigns, on the location of the easement north and west of the South-wester ly corner of
TN 10420 and providing access to TN 11366 from the driveway. Because the questions
were found by the trial court to ambiguous as a matter of law, the Court may freely
review such determinatio ns and hold that the Deed is not ambiguous on the cited issues.
The Court may then further ascertain and make a final determinatio n of the plain
meaning of the language of the Deed on each such issue. Inasmuch as Lewey and
Phyllis Lorenzen are deceased, Pearsons ask that the Court hold that the easement over
the driveway on Pearson's property no longer exists and quiet title against any further
claims by Lorenzen to use the driveway for ingress and egress.
th
Dated this 14 day of June, 2019.
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QUITCLAIM
\ · DEED
LA v!m.IAK S,

7eJ< /7t;t)
For Value Received

BOY T. WILLIAMS and.: QUINTIL
.

do herel>y convey, release. remise and forever- quitclaim tmto
LORENZP.N, bis wife,

- 709
281 PACE

. 8D~K~ ·

his wire,

.

I.Dim H. LO:a»!Z]N and PHILLIS L.
~

·
whcae curre!!t add.l'e38 ia West 3211 Daisy, Spokane , Washin gton 99~,
the :i.allo\"rlng descn'l::ed premisea. to-wit:

A tre.ct of land lying Uk.the North Half of Section 20,
Township 51 North, Ra:ag915 West, Boise Meridia n, Kooten ai
County, Idaho, more iar.- ·.Jl~ly describ ed es follows :
Begimt lng •at the Northw est .Corner af Tax No. 3178 as
describ vd in Book 14o of Deeds at Page 4-59, Records of

Kooten ai County, Idaho; thence North 64°17' :East, 48.9 feet;
thence North 16°55' West, 37.3 feet; thence South ?5°09'
1'!est, 89.6 feet; then(?e South 52°39'0 ?" East, 33.9 feet; .
thez:.:::e Sout!l 22°.50'50" Ea:;;t, 26.38 feet; thence North.
.56~;t?'. !l:~t, 20 feet to the Pvint - of Beginn ing.
SUBJE'.:T TO: Buildin g and use re1:Jtri ctions of record,
eMeme nts and rights of way common to the area.

RESERVING unto Gran.to re, their heirs, success ors and
assigns , the rigl:t to use the oval roadway ae B8.llle now
exists on the above describ ed proper ty 1 and

ilso grantiIJ g to Gr8ntee s the right to use £or :ingress
and egress the e:xistiD g roadway rwmillg from the South~este:rl y corner 0£ ~he ab-Ove describ ed proper ty Southe rly
to the existip g high1~ay.

'

\

•.:

I

.

tegetl-.er with :their o.ppurl.enances.

Dat~if: October .:t J' , 1976.

STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF KOOTl!NAI
day of Octobe r , 19 ?6 ,
On this ~
betor;i me, a notaey public in .and :for tho "1d State. per-

J

sonally app<>and ROY T. WILLIAMS
QUTh'Tl lU: WILLIAMS, bis. wife.

and

koof

a.-t.

..li,--,\
sTATE oF IDA.Ro, comrrY oF
I hereby cer~ ~t tma inGtrom Qt~,Uec t :lor~rd.. ,at,.?
the reqoll3t of

~/4c.,~ ~

A,f::'A.X..~e1t-;,;t:J,

~

/0

o'cfock
.qlJ.11!!,tes p..a
at
day of
idAA
t.hie
, in my ofllce, and dulY recotded In BIYA
19
of Deeds at Page

1·s ,~,,

~ M.,
•

CAROL DEtn

By-? 4:2:2 ~~~, ,.4:~ ~~L ----F-$/O O Mrul t<> :

9?a.:f l:u_

.8.

#7844
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